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When three decades of authoritarian rule unravelled in Indonesia following the fall 
of President Suharto in 1998, it was widely expected that this would also open the 
doors for a dramatically different sort of politics in which individuals and social 
organizations could demand accountable governance and rule of law. It was indeed 
true that the old centralized authoritarian regime gave way to a remarkably open 
system of electoral democracy and to the devolution of state administrative authority. 
A vibrant and often chaotic media emerged to debate ideas previously proscribed, and 
new figures flooded onto the political landscape. And in the volatile period that 
followed the Asian financial crisis just a few years previously, successive Indonesian 
governments had been forced to agree to the demands of the IMF (International 
Monetary Fund) and other global organizations for widespread reforms in finance and 
banking, in public and corporate governance, and in the judiciary, especially in the 
commercial courts.
However, such institutional changes were not reflected in the way social and 
economic power was concentrated or imposed in Indonesia. Well over a decade after 
the fall of the Suharto regime, access to and control of public office and state authority 
continues to be the key determinant of how private wealth and social power is 
accumulated and distributed. Many of the old faces continue to dominate politics and 
business, while new ones are drawn into the same predatory practices that had defined 
politics in Indonesia for decades. Even political parties that presented themselves as
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the new champions of good governance, such as the Islamic party, PKS (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party), became enmeshed in corrupt practices 
and dubious alliances. Rather than opening the door for political parties to emerge on 
the basis of claims to ideological or policy agendas, the same Suharto-era political 
parties continue to operate as escalators for careers and wealth, even if this function is 
now shared with some new political vehicles. And far from providing a new 
dimension of accountability and representation, the decentralization of administrative 
authority and parliamentary politics has extended the old ways of politics from the 
political center of Jakarta down to a bewildering range of individuals and 
organizations in the regions and towns of Indonesia.
In this paper we argue that these seemingly counter-intuitive developments are 
best analyzed within a structural political economy approach and understood in the 
context of the vast political conflicts that precede and follow democratic and market 
transitions and that preserve or reshape the social order that defined the old regime.1 
In other words, the disintegration of authoritarian rule and the introduction of 
democratic and market institutions do not in themselves give rise to a broader liberal 
transformation of society and politics. The forces and interests that had established 
their preeminence within the previous regime do not necessarily disappear along with 
the institutions of centralized authoritarian rule. As Nigel Harris has observed, "... 
when the state establishes a system for forced accumulation, this is not simply a set of 
arrangements that can be changed at will. It constitutes a social order, with a weight of 
inertia constituted by vested interests, the immediate beneficiaries, that inhibits the 
creation of any new order."2
The influence of previous authoritarian regimes on new democracies and market 
economies is also expressed in other ways. As Sheri Berman has reminded us in her 
analysis of the Arab Spring and of the rise of Fascism in Germany and Italy in the 
1920s and 1930s, the prospects for a coherent liberal politics are diminished where the 
previous order has disorganized civil society and destroyed liberal forces as part of its 
formula for rule.3 These circumstances can open the door for political chaos or money 
politics and for the entry of extremist, resentful, and violent political interests that 
appeal to the basest of xenophobic sentiments. At the very least, such cases show that 
so-called "transitions" to liberal forms of democracy are likely to be severely impeded 
where the social interests that support such a transition are weak or politically 
disorganized.
The central task of this study is to explain how those interests that had established 
political ascendancy within the previous Indonesian regime have been able to 
reorganize their power and preserve salient features of the old social and political 
order within the shell of the new democratic and market society. Specifically, we 
propose, it has been the rise of a highly cohesive and complex oligarchy that has led to
1 This thesis is most comprehensively set out in Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in 
Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). Given that this 
paper is a development of that thesis, and its defense in the current debate, the arguments in the book are 
necessarily referred to and repeated.
2 Nigel Harris, "New Bourgeoisies," The Journal of Development Studies 24,2 (1988): 47.
3 Sheri Berman, "The Promise of the Arab Spring: In Political Development, No Gain without Pain," 
Foreign Affairs 92,1 (fanuary/February 2013): 64—74.
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these conditions, an oligarchy that embraces both a particular form of dominance over 
state power and a distinct social and economic character that is the key to the puzzle in 
Indonesia.4 The paper begins with an explanation of what this specific form of 
oligarchy is and is not, on the basis of a political economy theoretical framework. The 
aim is to clarify factors that have been often lost in translation between the parallel 
universes of pluralist liberal political science, rational choice neoliberalism, and critical 
political economy, and to set a firm basis for debate.
This explanation is followed by an examination of how our thesis is located in the 
larger terrain of political and political economy analysis of Indonesia in the post- 
Suharto era. In this evaluation, the theoretical focus is more firmly placed on the 
agency of rational individuals and the transformative capacity of institutions. In the 
final and largest part of the paper, we provide a detailed analysis of how oligarchy has 
shaped state authority and social power in contemporary Indonesia and how this 
system of power has survived and colonized the political and economic upheavals of 
1997 and 1998 and remains the defining force in contemporary Indonesia.
The Oligarchy Thesis: What It Is and Is Not
It is fair to say that the broader debate about the evolution of political power in 
Indonesia since the fall of Suharto has been largely focused on the critique (or defense) 
of the oligarchy thesis developed by Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz and by Jeffrey 
Winters. Such critiques have included arguments that the oligarchy thesis neglects the 
possibilities of agency and presents a pessimistic picture of a country caught in a 
structural straitjacket; that it denies the importance of institutions as mechanisms of 
change; that it denies the significance of non-material factors in politics; and that it 
denies the real inroads made by local and grassroots political and social movements in 
questions of policy, accountability, and representation.5 A discussion of these critiques 
requires some brief clarification of the oligarchy thesis, what it argues and what it does 
not.
The Oligarchy Thesis: W hat I t  Is
Oligarchy is treated here as a system of power relations that enables the 
concentration of wealth and authority and its collective defense. It is a concept of 
oligarchy that is set in a larger theoretical framework of structural political economy. 
Thus, the construction of oligarchy is understood in the context of capitalist
4 See Richard Robison and Andrew Rosser, "Surviving the Meltdown: Liberal Reform and Political 
Oligarchy in Indonesia," in Politics and Markets in the Wake o f the Asian Crisis, ed. Richard Robison, Mark 
Beeson, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and Hyuk Rae Kim (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 171-91; and Vedi R. 
Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2010). The same broad proposition is made by Jeffrey Winters in his wider historical and 
comparative analysis of different forms of oligarchy. See Jeffrey Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
5 In fact, the rationale for the workshop in Sydney that is the basis of the papers in this collection was to 
bring such critiques into a direct conversation with the proponents of the idea of oligarchy as an 
explanatory concept. Critiques, including those above, are found in Pepinsky, Liddle, and Aspinall, all in 
this special issue.
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development, especially as manifested in late developing capitalist countries. The rise 
of oligarchy in Indonesia at a time of growth and expansion of market capitalism 
during the New Order is seen as the product of struggles over the accumulation of 
private and corporate wealth and the way control of public institutions and state 
authority became essential to this process. This particular fusion of political authority 
and economic power has been a common characteristic of countries in the earliest 
stages of capitalist development, as evidenced by cases ranging from the South Sea 
Bubble and the joint stock scandals of early English capitalism to the "robber barons" 
of late-nineteenth-century America. This phenomenon has been variously described as 
"primitive accumulation" or "political capitalism."
Importantly, oligarchy is not conceived as a type of economic or political regime in 
itself nor tied to any specific form of regime in this analysis. In fact, we propose that 
oligarchy can survive and flourish in a range of regime types, including democracy, as 
we currently see in post-Suharto Indonesia. Nevertheless, oligarchies are historically 
defined. Significantly, for example, a plutocracy cannot rule from outside the 
apparatus of the state in Indonesia in the same way it does in the United States. This is 
partly because its biggest players in Indonesia are and have been ethnically Chinese 
and are therefore constrained in their public political role. It is also because Indonesian 
capitalism was incubated within the state itself, establishing a distinct relationship 
between state capitalism and private interest that did not exist in America.
The focus of the analysis is, therefore, on the structural factors that gave rise to a 
particular form of politico-business oligarchy in Indonesia, specifically on how state 
authority and bourgeois interest historically evolved, interacted, and became fused 
during the New Order. It is important that the relationships between state authority 
and the bourgeoisie in Indonesia changed from a Bonapartist form in the early Suharto 
era to one that took an oligarchic form in the later New Order period. This was a state 
that had become the possession of its own officials and that acted to preserve its own 
institutional underpinnings and on behalf of major capitalist interests. Such a state was 
transformed to one that was defined by an increasing fusion of wealth and politico- 
bureaucratic power, articulated in the relationships and interminglings between the 
leading families of business and those of politics and the bureaucracy as they became 
enmeshed directly in the ownership and control of capital.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this treatment of oligarchy is the 
suggestion that democracy has not undermined the oligarchy that emerged under the 
New Order, although the theory does acknowledge that Indonesia's dominant elite has 
been forced to sustain its ascendancy in different ways. For example, oligarchic power 
in Indonesia now more distinctly accommodates members of the growing apparatus of 
administration and politics at the local level. Many of these local members have 
successfully reinvented themselves as parliamentarians and political party leaders and 
forged new kinds of alliances with local business interests, leaders of mass 
organizations old and new, and, sometimes, even with military or police commands. 
Many former political, business, and criminal elements have used the diffusion and 
decentralization of government to establish quite new political identities.
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The Oligarchy Thesis: W hat I t  Is N ot and W hat I t  Rejects
a) The Primacy of Institutional Change
The oligarchy thesis does not dismiss the significance of institutions in influencing 
political behavior, although it does place primacy on the coalitions of power that 
underpin them. In other words, we place emphasis on where institutions come from 
and how they are constructed or expropriated by powerful forces to serve their own 
needs.6 Nevertheless, the thesis does not argue that "nothing has changed in 
Indonesia." There is little doubt that the "shock therapy" of change in both economic 
and political institutions after 1998 has meant that entrenched oligarchies and others 
have to find new ways of surviving and operating within an increasingly globalized 
market and a democracy that is both decentralized and based on electoral politics.7 
Moreover, it is no longer possible for those holding power to ignore the demands and 
resentments of social coalitions of interests that may emerge at the local level of 
politics.
b) Ideas about Indonesian Uniqueness
The critical political economy approach that infuses the oligarchy thesis refutes 
exceptionalist or relativist explanations of politics or ideas, including those based on 
cultural or behavioral factors. One of the key advantages of utilizing the concept of 
oligarchy within a critical political economy framework is to better enable historically 
informed comparisons of the Indonesian case with those of others, including countries 
outside the developing world.8 Even the case of the United States, where oligarchic 
power has been a traditional feature of US politics in big cities as well as in the form of 
rural populism, provides important comparative insights that can illuminate the 
Indonesian case.9 These comparative cases highlight the way oligarchic and plutocratic 
politics can be constrained by entrenched and organized social forces in quite different 
ways. The relative feebleness of such influences in Indonesia, in spite of the 
developments observed by Edward Aspinall and by Teri Caraway and Michele Ford, 
provides a particularly telling insight.10
c) The "Matter of Time" Argument
This theory does not assume that there will be linear progression from 
authoritarianism to a predatory form of democracy and then to a liberal form. In other 
words, we propose that there are clear limits to the utility of arguments regarding the
6 S. N. Sangmpam, "Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions in Developing Countries," Political 
Studies 55,1 (2007): 201-24.
7 Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia.
8 In our various studies, we have brought in such cases as post-Soviet Russia, Egypt, and the broader 
Middle East. See Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia; Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison, 
"Neo-Liberal Reforms and Illiberal Consolidations: The Indonesian Paradox," Journal of Development 
Studies 41,2 (February 2005): 220—41; and Vedi R. Hadiz and Richard Robison, "Political Economy and 
Islamic Politics: Insights from the Indonesian Case," New Political Economy 17,2 (2012): 137-55.
9 Winters, Oligarchy.
10 Edward Aspinall, "Popular Agency and Interests in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation," this volume; and Teri L. Caraway and Michele Ford, "Towards Issue-based Politics? 
Unions and Electoral Contests in Democratic Indonesia," paper presented at the workshop Beyond 
Oligarchy? Critical Exchanges on Accountability and Representation in Indonesia, University of Sydney, 
December 14-15, 2012.
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"growing pains of democracy." Indeed, the factors that historically made possible the 
transformation to liberal forms of democracy elsewhere are not easily transposed to 
Indonesia. These may be the result of a conjuncture of historical circumstances that will 
not be repeated. Given these distinctions, the question is not about whether Indonesia 
has "transitioned to democracy," or whether its democracy has now "consolidated," 
but instead asks what are the configurations of social and political power that are 
shaping the evolution of Indonesian democracy. The product may be a form of 
democracy that is anomalous to the idealized liberal democratic template but which 
may thrive nevertheless. As Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz have argued in the 
case of Africa, what appear to be highly dysfunctional and chaotic political systems 
may, indeed, be highly efficient in terms of guaranteeing the interests of specific 
groups.11 And the cases of Russia, China, and even Singapore, for example, suggest a 
range of models in which illiberal politics and capitalism can survive and flourish 
together over time.
d) Exclusion of Non-Material Factors
There is no suggestion in structural political economy that non-material factors are 
unimportant in shaping conflicts over power and the way state authority is exercised. 
As we shall see, the influences of ideas of nationalism, populism, and corporatism, for 
example, are integral to our understanding of the rise of oligarchy throughout the 
Sukarno and Suharto periods and of the ways in which oligarchy defended itself 
against liberal and social democratic critics. We do not, however, see material and non­
material factors as separate and independent—a matter of choice for participants or 
scholars—but rather as always being bound in complex relationships.
e) Agency Trumps Structure
It is not generally suggested in political economy approaches that individuals are 
powerless to resist structural imperatives. Individuals and organizations have room to 
move within the circumstances they inherit. The demise of the New Order and the 
advent of electoral democracy have clearly made possible the emergence of new 
players and widened alliances that influence politics in substantive ways. 
Nevertheless, the oligarchy thesis rejects the liberal pluralist idea that individuals may 
simply accumulate resources such as wealth, authority, status, media control, and so 
on by virtue of the voluntary exercise of individual skills, including that of 
leadership.12 Instead, it is argued that, in the Indonesian case, individuals invariably 
find themselves required to accommodate the logic of the existing power structure. The 
difficulties of operating outside this logic are illustrated by the fall from grace of such 
former reformers within the Democratic Party as Anas Urbaningrum and Andi 
Mallarangeng as well as in the case of the PKS previously mentioned. Even the 
swashbuckling reformer from Solo, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), has had to enter dubious 
alliances in his time as mayor of Solo and as a Jakarta gubernatorial candidate; the
11 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford and 
Bloomington, IN: The International African Institute with James Currey, and Indiana University Press, 
1999).
12 See R. William Liddle, "Improving the Quality of Democracy in Indonesia: Toward a Theory of Action," 
this volume.
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gubernatorial campaign involved no less than accommodation with Gerindra, the 
political vehicle of former Suharto son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto.
f) A Theory of Pessimism
These disagreements over agency and structure have led to claims that the 
Robison-Hadiz thesis is inherently pessimistic about the prospects for progressive 
change in Indonesia. We will deal with this critique more thoroughly in the final part 
of this paper. Such claims of pessimism conflate the rejection of institutional or agency 
based explanations of change and transition in Indonesia with a larger rejection of the 
possibility of change itself.
Critical Political Economy and Contending Theoretical Explanations
The central claim of a critical political economy approach is not merely that 
economics and politics are interrelated but that conflicts over wealth and power are 
part of the same broad process of social change.13 The rise of new forms of production 
and property give rise to new forces and interests and to new conflicts over the rules 
that will govern markets on such issues as property rights, working conditions, the 
provision of public welfare and public goods. Such rules and the institutions of 
economic life are, if judged from the political economy perspective, not simply based 
on questions of efficiency but is also about power and how it is distributed. It is due to 
the way in which the distribution of economic power and the nature of the state itself is 
formed that different levels of political resources and economic leverage are 
constructed.
Thus, the central task of political economy analysis is to explain the forces and 
interests that are historically thrown up in the evolution of capitalism and how 
conflicts between these shape economic and political life and the institutions in which 
they operate. It is important in explaining the evolution of this configuration of power 
that capitalism in Indonesia has moved from a colonial agrarian export economy to a 
nationalist import-substitution industrialism and, finally, to an export-oriented 
resources and industrial system more closely integrated within the global market 
economy. Concern with these issues distinguishes structural political economy from 
the main contending theoretical explanations of social and political change in 
contemporary Indonesia.
Modernization theory has been perhaps the most pervasive influence in the study 
of Indonesia over several decades. In its classical version, it has conceived of a process 
of political development synonymous with progress toward democratic pluralism and 
regarded as the natural accompaniment of economic development.14 As R. William 
Liddle argues, economic growth is positive for democracy in that it gives rise to a
13 Some examples of this general approach to explaining social and political change include: Colin Leys,
The Rise and Fall of Development Theory (Oxford: James Currey, 1996); and Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of 
Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 
1997). Such approaches are not confined to developing economies. See Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy 
and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism (London: Macmillan, 1994).
14 See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).
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progressive middle class that demands personal autonomy, freedom, rule of law, and 
participation.15That such a flowering of middle class/civil society failed to eventuate 
in Indonesia, even where economic growth took place, was explained in the 1960s and 
1970s as a result of traditional culture's resistance to such a change, manifest in the 
consolidation of successive forms of despotic rule. Not surprisingly, a common point of 
reference was the feudal and hierarchical nature of Javanese court culture, the 
resilience of which was thought to lead to irrational political behavior that was not in 
conformity with the ideal type of Western liberal democracy.16
The apparent absence of democratizing agents was resolved in a different way in 
the work of Samuel Huntington, where the main marker of modernity shifted from 
pluralist politics and democratic culture to the institutionalization of state power and 
political order. 17 The product of heightened Cold War anxieties, revisionist 
modernization theory placed great emphasis on political stability because disorder 
could open up opportunities exploitable by the Left. Reflecting such concerns, 
Emmerson18 and Liddle19 thus pondered whether the alternative to New Order 
authoritarianism was descent into chaos. For Liddle, especially, the authoritarianism of 
Suharto appeared to underpin economic development, for he believed that the 
president's personal interest was to support policies that promoted growth via the 
macroeconomic reforms advanced by international development organizations, 
especially after the fall of international oil prices in the early 1980s.20
The appeal of this version of modernization theory was severely eroded, however, 
as Indonesia's economy almost collapsed as a result of the Asian Economic Crisis of 
1997-98. The idea of authoritarianism as the spearhead of modernization rather than 
the expression of specific economic and social interests was undermined when Suharto 
initially attempted to resist the macroeconomic reforms insisted upon by the 
International Monetary Fund rather than rise above the interests of the powerful 
oligarchic alliance that had underpinned the regime, including not least those of the 
Suharto family itself.21
Interestingly, some facets of this version of modernization theory have reappeared 
in different guises within neoliberal political economy and economic neo-institutional 
approaches. Theorists within these camps had long argued that it is the very power of 
the state to intervene in markets that provides the conditions for the rise of the rent­
15 Liddle, this volume
16 A recent expression of this approach is found in Webber, who maintains that the greatest obstacle to 
Indonesia's successful transition to democracy is cultural in nature. He suggests, however, that the values 
and norms associated with Javanese feudal culture—which obfuscate corruption and abuse of power— 
may be on the verge of breaking down because Indonesia's electoral democracy forces leaders and parties 
to behave more accountably and rationally. See Douglas Webber, "Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? 
Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia," Democratization 13,3 (2006): 396—420.
17 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
18 Donald K. Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength," in Political Power 
and Communications in Indonesia, ed. Karl Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (Berkeley, CA, and London: 
University of California Press, 1980), pp. 104—5.
19 R. William Liddle, "Development or Democracy," Far Eastern Economic Review 9 (November 1989), p. 23.
20 R. William Liddle, "The Relative Autonomy of the Third World Politician: Soeharto and Indonesian 
Economic Development in Comparative Perspective," International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991): 403-27.
21 Robison and Rosser, "Surviving the Meltdown."
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seeking economy, preventing good policy made in the public interest, diverting scarce 
resources from productive investment, and strangling economic growth.22 However, 
neoliberals in the World Bank and elsewhere began to question the idea that simply 
dismantling the state would produce efficient markets and to embrace the idea that the 
successful transplanting of markets required a strong framework of regulatory 
institutions that could only be supplied by the state.23 Reminiscent of Huntingtonian 
concerns for political institutionalization, some neoliberals began to argue that benign 
authoritarian leadership could enforce free markets in the face of predatory officials 
and rent-seeking robber barons.24 Prominent neo-classical economist Deepak Lai 
proposed that "a courageous, ruthless, and perhaps undemocratic government is 
required to run roughshod over these newly created special interest groups."25 Such 
sentiments became the basis for the World Bank's growing attraction to the notion of 
rule by a corps of enlightened technocrats or persons who are somehow liberated from 
the pursuit of self-interest and thus able to see beyond short-term goals to the public 
interest."26
The residual influences of modernization theory, whether in its liberal pluralist or 
institutional, technocratic managerial versions, shape the way post-Suharto Indonesia 
is understood outside the political economy approach. While pluralists search among 
the middle classes and in the institutions of elections for signs of liberal transformation, 
neoliberals place the blame for growing disorganization and chaos on democracy itself 
and the opportunities it offers to self-seeking interests and predatory raiders.27
Other influences can also be seen in the application of the democratic transitions 
literature in Indonesia.28 With its origins in the analysis of political change in the 
Iberian Peninsula and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, democratic transitions
22 Deepak Lai, The Poverty of Development Economics (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1983); James M. 
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,
1962); Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981); 
and Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nation: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Structural Rigidities 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).
23 World Bank, Indonesia: Developing Private Enterprise (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1991); World Bank, 
Managing Development: The Governance Dimension, discussion paper (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1991); 
World Bank, World Development Report, Building Institutions for Markets (Washington, DC: World Bank 
2002); World Bank, Indonesia: Accelerating Recovery in Uncertain Times, report from the East Asia Poverty 
Reduction and Economics Management Unit, October 13, 2000.
24 T. N. Srinivasan, Neo-classical Political Economy: The State and Economic Development (New Haven, CT: 
Economic Growth Center, Yale University, 1985).
25 Lai, The Poverty of Development Economics, p. 33.
26 Merle S. Grindle, "The New Political Economy: Positive Economics and Negative Politics," in Politics and 
Policy Making in Developing Countries, ed. Gerald M. Meier (San Francisco, CA: International Center for 
Economic Growth, 1991), pp. 41-67.
27 See, for example, Ron Duncan and Ross McLeod, "The State and the Market in Democratic Indonesia," 
in Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance, ed. Ross McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), pp. 73-92.
28 R. William Liddle, Crafting Indonesian Democracy: International Conference toward Structural Reforms for 
Democratization in Indonesia: Problems and Prospects (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 2001); R. William Liddle, 
"Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules," in The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional 
Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); 
Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2005); and Paul J. Carnegie, The Road from Authoritarianism to Democratization in 
Indonesia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
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theory was distinguished by its reassertion of the primacy of social agency in political 
analysis and the crafting of benign pacts following the demise of authoritarian 
regimes—pacts through which democratic institutions replete with new rules for 
politics can be forged. This theory also reasserts the proposition that institutions can 
shape social and political behavior, dismissing the necessity of social revolution or 
transformation as a precondition for democratic change.29
These themes became attractive to many Indonesian analysts who hoped that the 
post-Suharto era would ultimately produce benign and liberal outcomes even if those 
outcomes developed after an initial period of confusion. What they offered was the 
possibility that good decisions made by the right kind of individuals, able to rise above 
patrimonial politics, could somehow bypass the structural constraints to 
democratization and empower those who had been marginalized under the 
authoritarian New Order.30
It soon became clear, however, that Indonesian democratization had provided a 
lifeline to the oligarchs incubated and nurtured within the previous centralized system 
of authority and patronage. This was a democracy driven by money politics and in 
which competition between an array of predatory interests over the spoils of state 
power, institutions, and resources would take more chaotic forms than under the New 
Order. Political parties and parliaments were largely unencumbered by programs or 
ideologies, and certainly free of liberal policies, and only occasionally subject to the 
demands of broader social interests that remain largely disorganized.
As the democratic transitions problematic began to lose its luster,31 a new literature 
has begun to emerge that appears self-consciously to place emphasis on civil society 
movements and new developments in such arenas as organized labor. Initiated by 
labor, new waves of strike action have taken place in some localities, making use of 
opportunities provided by democratization, and to which the Indonesian press has 
devoted considerable attention. The point of such works is, again, to explore the 
possibly of social agency trumping structural constraints, although these studies are 
focused on local and grassroots organizations rather than on technocrats and political 
leaders. Some but not all of this discourse is influenced by the broad literature on social 
movements and contentious politics as put forward by Doug McAdams, Charles Tilly, 
and Sidney Tarrow.32 Writing on the Indonesian labor movement, Benny Hari 
Juliawan, for example, ponders whether Indonesia is becoming a "movement
29 Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
30 See, for example, Gerry Van Klinken, "How a Democratic Deal Might be Struck," in Reformasi: Crisis and 
Change in Indonesia, ed. Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (Melbourne: Monash Asia 
Institute, 1999), pp. 59-68.
31 For the reasons, see Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal o f Democracy 13,1 
(2002): 15-21.
32 See, e.g., Doug McAdams, Charles Tilly, and Sidney Tarrow, Dynamics o f Contention (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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society"33—a concept borrowed from David Meyer and Tarrow's analysis of public 
protest in advanced industrial societies.34
Social movement theory has its parallels with political economy theory in that it 
places an emphasis on change as a process driven by conflicts among politically 
organized social interests. A central point of divergence separating these two 
perspectives, however, lies in the different ways of understanding the relationship 
between the state and social power. In the political economy view, the rise of a 
vigorous civil society historically requires not the shrinking of state power, but its 
consolidation in a form that provides the guarantees of civil rights and rule of law.35 In 
other words, incremental sniping at the margins by social movements and NGOs has 
limited effectiveness. Real change in Indonesia requires that state power itself be 
wrested from the hands of a reconstituted oligarchy whose authority is embedded in 
the enforcement of institutional and legal practices that are antithetical to liberal 
notions of society and markets.
The Idea of Oligarchy and the Explanation of Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia
How, then, does a political economy analysis and a thesis that is focused upon 
oligarchy explain the way power and authority are reconstructed in the wake of 
authoritarian regimes? A pluralist might look for individuals able to construct their 
own power resources as a result of a capacity for leadership. Institutional theorists will 
assess the design and capacity of institutions and the levels of efficient governance able 
to insulate technocratic authority from vested interests. Other social theorists may 
investigate the extent of social capital, identifying this resource as the basis for a 
vibrant civil society. Structural political economists, on the other hand, will look at the 
way social power and interest are forged and configured and how this configuration is 
organized politically.
The questions to be asked are to some degree suggested by the strikingly different 
ways that authoritarian regimes around the world have collapsed and been 
transformed into various forms of democracy over the past several decades.36 The fall 
of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, for example, raises the question of why Indonesia has 
not descended into the political chaos, or at least the gridlock, that has defined the 
Egyptian situation and why the threat of retreat into some variant of illiberal politics, 
whether Islamic or military, has not been a real possibility in the Indonesian case. Or 
why have there been no prolonged power struggles within the ruling political and 
social forces and their military allies and emerging business interests as occurred in 
Thailand? There, the political struggles that followed the economic crisis of 1997-98
33 Benny Hari Juliawan, "Street-level Politics: Labour Protests in Post-authoritarian Indonesia," Journal o f 
Contemporary Asia 41,3 (2011): 349-70.
34 David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century 
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
35 See E. M. Wood, "The Uses and Abuses of Civil Society," The Socialist Register 26 (1990): 60-84.
36 Clearly we do not intend to enter into any extended comparative analysis in the context of this paper.
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culminated in the victory of elected business politicians within a new form of 
nationalist and populist political alliance."7
What is required in the political economy approach is an investigation of the 
genesis of Indonesia's oligarchy and how its political relations with other social forces 
and interests evolved. Several propositions emerge. Most important is that we 
understand oligarchy and the political regimes it spawned not simply as political 
phenomena but recognize their social character. Thus, the Suharto regime can be seen 
as resting upon a broad system of oligarchic relations that had, in themselves, become 
the central glue for a social order and determined the way power and wealth were 
accumulated and allocated from Jakarta down to the regions and towns of Indonesia. 
Oligarchy's growing political coherence and social pervasiveness meant it was no 
longer dependent specifically upon the institutions of centralized authoritarian rule 
but could embrace and colonize both market capitalism and political democracy. It was 
able progressively to shed its reliance on the coercive power of military or security 
forces, at least compared to the extent that defined Mubarak's oligarchy, for example. *38
A second factor that has shaped Indonesia's political economy since the fall of 
Suharto is the way the emerging oligarchy organized its political relations with other 
forces. It is important that the previous Sukarno and Suharto regimes had thoroughly 
disorganized and fragmented social and political organizations and ideologies that 
threatened their absolute ascendancy, whether these were based within the liberal 
middle class, a radical and working class, or even a reactionary Islamic petty 
bourgeoisie. This effective disruption of civil society was achieved not simply through 
repression by the security apparatus but also within a more complex corporatist co­
option of the civil society organizations. So long as prosperity was increased, 
Indonesia's middle class embraced Suharto and failed to grasp liberal ideas with any 
enthusiasm. As a consequence, when the old regime fell, despite the initial enthusiasm 
and energy of reformist movements, those with the most potential to strengthen civil 
society have never been able to recover any substantial ideological or organizational 
cohesion or build a substantial social base.
At the same time, the answer to the Indonesian "puzzle" also lies in the fact that 
attempts by the IMF and other international financial institutions to enforce constraints 
on the politics of oligarchy by means of institutional reform following the financial and 
economic crises of 1997-98 have been limited. This is not because of a successful 
resistance to democracy or markets on the part of the oligarchs but because these now 
suited their needs and provided a framework within which they could consolidate 
their authority and economic power. Liberals and neoliberals were to search vainly for 
progressive forces to support technocratic rule or the broader scope of liberal 
democracy or to dismantle the tentacles of oligarchy throughout the public 
bureaucracy or in the new parliaments.
1 Kevin Hewison, "Neo-liberalism and Domestic Capital: The Political Outcomes of the Economic Crisis 
in Thailand," The Journal o f Development Studies 41,2 (2005): 310-30.
38 Samer Soliman, The Autumn o f Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 63-65.
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Oligarchy and the N eoliberal Challenge
How, then, did oligarchy embrace the market and the rules that defined it? 
Neoliberalism and oligarchy have had a long and complex relationship in Indonesia. 
The rise of Suharto in 1965 had been welcomed by Western governments, especially 
when the new regime appointed a team of Western-trained economists to key 
economic ministries and began to wind back the system of nationalist state capitalism 
established by former President Sukarno.39
Nevertheless, the relationship between the neoliberal reformers and the oligarchs 
was to become tense and sometimes hostile. Despite the moves to dismantle the 
"guided economy" of the Sukarno period, important aspects of state capitalism were 
retained. Many state corporations continued to control access to key sectors of the 
economy, including in transport and communication, banking, trade, electricity 
generation, mineral resources, and agriculture. In part, such state-owned behemoths as 
Bulog and Pertamina served the old agendas of economic nationalism and protected 
industrial development, stabilizing commodity prices and subsidizing strategic 
industries, notably in steel, petrochemicals, shipping, engineering, fabrication, and in 
the communications sector.40
In reality, the authority exercised by the state over state bank credit, import 
licenses, forestry and mining concessions, and government contracts and procurement 
increasingly became the basis of a vast system of patronage and favor. At one level, 
rents raised by such activities became important sources of funding for the military 
and other state bodies and for individual officials and their families. At the same time, 
they were to be the underpinnings of a substantial domestic class of capitalists and 
associated swarms of rentiers and "fixers." The most important of these capitalists were 
drawn from the ethnic Chinese community and included the leaders of business 
empires like those of Liem Sioe Liong and William Soerjadjaja. To a much lesser extent, 
indigenous Indonesian business groups also launched their business ventures as 
recipients of contracts and monopolies allocated by powerful patrons within the state.41
By the 1980s, those interests controlling the terminals of this system began to take a 
more oligarchic form as the families of powerful officials and military officers, no 
longer satisfied with simply collecting tolls, now directly entered the world of business 
in their own right as owners of capital and as shareholders. This metamorphosis of 
officials and politicians into a putative bourgeoisie has been a common feature in 
developing capitalist economies, especially in places where they emerged from 
engagement in various forms of state capitalism.42 In the case of Indonesia, the way 
was led by the president's family, which constructed a vast business empire that 
extended from banking, forestry, and agriculture to automobiles and petro-chemicals. 
Other families from the ranks of political leaders, state officials, and military officers 
followed, not only at the national level but in a pattern to be repeated down to the
39 J. Panglaykim and K. D. Thomas, "The New Order and the Economy," Indonesia 3 (April 1967): 73-120.
40 Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986).
41 Ibid.
42 Events in the Middle East have provided an insight into the rise of family business dynasties from 
political origins in that region. Much of the vitriol of reformers was directed at the venality of the sons and 
relatives of various dictators, including Gaddafi, Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Saddam Hussein.
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provinces and towns and involving the families of governors, bupatis, and local 
military commanders.43
At the same time, policies also became more directly the instruments by which 
oligarchic interest was enhanced. Legislation to reserve government contracts and 
procurement for domestic business, under regulations Keppres 10 and 14 in 1979 and 
1980, channelled vast amounts of state funds into the hands of the State Secretariat and 
its Team 10 and through the president's special fund, Banpres, for the same purposes.44 
Among its beneficiaries were a growing and politically important group of indigenous 
(pribumi) business figures, many of whom, notably Aburizal Bakrie, have continued to 
be key business and political players to the present time. In other words, the system of 
oligarchy had increasingly become the defining framework within which political 
power and wealth in Indonesia were drawn together and in which a divergence of 
families and groups were encompassed.45
It is important that oligarchy sought to consolidate itself not by simply negating the 
rules of the market but by selectively exploiting and expropriating them. In some cases, 
the state sector and its lucrative monopolies, including in banking, power generation, 
and telecommunications, were dismantled and transferred into private hands. In 
particular, the deregulation of the finance sector enabled a dramatic inflow of global 
capital for domestic investors. The rapid establishment of private banks, with little 
regulatory control, enabled private conglomerates to mobilize vast new sources of 
private funding for their own enterprises.46
Organizations like the World Bank and their Indonesian technocratic allies had 
only limited influence over this runaway system of oligarchy, especially with 
Indonesia's economic growth surging ahead in the 1980s and 1990s. There were other 
constraints on neoliberal agendas from unlikely quarters. Western governments were 
unwilling to upset governments and forces that opened the doors to their investors and 
served their larger geostrategic interests, and which kept radical and reactionary 
threats at bay. And large Western corporate investors competed with each other to get 
a place at the table where huge infrastructure and resource projects figured as 
important prizes; these investors proved willing to enter into the murky politics of 
oligarchy in the process. When the edifice of highly leveraged growth came apart in 
1997 and 1998, Western banks, contractors, and resource companies were deeply 
implicated in the practices and relationships at the heart of the crisis.
43 Robison, Indonesia: The Rise o f Capital.
44 See Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power, pp. 58, 60. The amounts of state funds involved: US$20 
billion between 1980 and 1986. See Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 151-64; and Robinson Pangaribuan, The Indonesian State 
Secretariat 1945-1993 (Perth: Asia Research Centre, 1995), pp. 35-41.
45 See Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power, pp. 57, 60.
46 Ibid., pp. 82-84.
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Surviving the Crisis: How Economic Power Was Reorganized
The long coalescence of authoritarian politics, market capitalism, and oligarchy 
appeared to come to a dramatic end with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, as 
Indonesia was plunged into a destructive economic collapse that exposed the real and 
fragile political underpinnings of its economic miracle. An economy that had enjoyed 
decades of growth was forced to submit to the humiliating demands for policy and 
institutional reform by the IMF as Indonesia confronted a crisis of public and private 
debt that paralyzed its financial and banking institutions and engulfed its major 
corporate conglomerates.47 While some neoliberal economists placed the blame for the 
crisis upon dysfunction in the global financial architecture,48 it was more widely 
accepted that Asian economies fell under the weight of their own inefficiency and the 
widespread cronyism that permeated the governments of the region. IMF managing 
director, Michel Camdessus, argued that the crisis resulted from Asian governments' 
and corporations' refusal to adhere to the disciplines of global markets and was a 
lesson for Asia's policy-makers and a "blessing in disguise" that would pave the way 
for better policy choices.49
The huge catalogue of demands set by the IMF as conditions for its US$30 billion 
rescue package included stringent requirements for reforms in governance and rule of 
law, as well as transparency and disclosure of information that enabled prices and 
risks to be set at their true value.50 More immediately, the IMF set out plans for an 
extensive recapitalization of banks and debt repayment by Indonesia's struggling 
corporate moguls.51 Yet, the expectation that the bitter lessons of the crisis would be, in 
themselves, sufficient to change things failed to take into account the real factors that 
defined any social or economic order. As Pranab Bardhan has argued, the significance 
of crisis in bringing about real change lies not so much in the lessons it offers to 
improve efficiency but in the way crisis undermines existing political forces and 
enhances new and reformist ones.52 Because reforms are not simply about the 
efficiency of markets, but have real implications for the way power is distributed and 
how existing elites are sustained, such interests will resist reforms even where the 
economic costs are severe.
In the Indonesian case, attempts to close insolvent banks and to force insolvent 
groups to part with assets and repay debt have met with fierce resistance. This was not
47 Ibid., pp. 6-10.
48 Ross McLeod, "Indonesia," in East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One, ed. Ross McLeod 
and Ross Garnaut (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 31—48; Ross Garnaut, "The Financial Crisis: A Watershed 
in Economic Thought about East Asia," Asian Pacific Economic Literature 12,1 (May 1998): 1-11; and Hal Hill, 
The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Crises (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia 
Studies, 1999).
49 "Socialist International," editorial, Asian Wall Street Journal, December 18,1997; "An $18 Billion 
Inoculation," Asian Wall Street Journal, February 5,1998.
50 See Gary Hamilton, "Asian Business Networks in Transition: Or, What Alan Greenspan Does Not Know 
about the Asian Business Crisis," in The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis, ed. T. J. Pempel (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 47.
51 Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power, pp. 6-10.
52 Pranab Bardhan, "The New Institutional Economics and Development Theory: A Brief Critical 
Assessment," World Development 17,9 (1989): 1389-95.
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only true in the dying days of the Suharto regime.53 Despite the starkness of the 
"lessons" of the financial crisis and the huge leverage of the IMF and other agencies in 
pressing for specific reforms in policy and governance, oligarchy and its major players 
were ultimately able to survive. The key to this "success" was the resilience of the 
networks of political authority and economic interest that underpinned and defined 
oligarchy and permeated the institutions of the state itself. Neoliberal reformers and 
their allies were never able politically to dismantle these.
One critical illustration of this failure to reform and uproot Indonesia's oligarchy 
can be found in the way the IMF program of bank recapitalization was carried out. 
Despite the fact that most of Indonesia's beleaguered and insolvent banks were 
revealed to have contravened capital adequacy provisions and the IMF's laws on intra­
group lending, these institutions were provided with large injections of funds by Bank 
Indonesia in the form of so-called liquidity funds (BLBI, Bantuan Likuiditas Bank 
Indonesia) intended to enable the banks to remain liquid, but which, in reality, were 
often sent offshore immediately to prop up other parts of the corporate groups. While 
the establishment of IBRA (the Indonesian Bank Recapitalization Agency) was 
intended to secure the assets of the disabled banks to fund a government bailout, in 
reality it enabled many of the conglomerates to warehouse their assets, write down 
debts at inflated values assigned to assets, and, in some cases, to repurchase assets at 
much reduced prices.54
One of the reasons for this great escape was the continuing grip of oligarchy on the 
critical parts of the bureaucracy, including in many key financial ministries and in the 
judiciary and commercial courts, where the will to pursue corruptors and debtors was 
undermined as the central elements in the judiciary proved reluctant to convict corrupt 
political and business figures.55
Two of Indonesia's presidents, Abdurahman Wahid and now Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, made the fight against corruption a central plank in their political 
programs. This struck a responsive chord with the public. The Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) was thus established and has been 
successful in bringing charges against a range of politicians and business figures that 
were not possible under the previous regime, although its reach remains limited.56 The 
investigations of non-government organizations, the KPK, and the media continue to 
provide detailed insights into the way politics and business continue to be inextricably 
entangled, as was shown in the spectacle that was the Bank Century case, which 
reached into the very heart of the Democratic Party, led by the president. This is a 
pattern that reaches from the heights of national politics and the most powerful 
corporate figures down into the arenas of provincial and subprovincial politics.57
53 Robison and Rosser, "Surviving the Meltdown."
54 Discussed in detail in Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power, pp. 187-222.
55 Timothy Lindsey, "Black Letter, Black Market, and Bad Faith: Corruption and the Failure of Law 
Reform," in Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects o f Reformasi and Crisis, ed. Chris Manning and Pierre van 
Dierman (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 278-92.
56 Simon Butt, Corruption and Law in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 2012).
57 Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia.
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It is significant that, despite the new leverage of reformers and regulatory 
institutions, oligarchy and its beneficiaries still operate openly. KPK continues to be 
pressured by powerful interests seeking to discredit its officials, and in some cases 
influential figures still appear to possess immunity from legal redress, as demonstrated 
in the case of Aburizal Bakrie.58
Oligarchy and the Challenge o f  L iberal Politics
Middle-class liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights and rule of law, has 
been a slender but consistent thread in the political history of Indonesia. Through the 
political prominence of middle-class intellectuals and professionals, those advocating 
liberalism exercised an influence beyond its numbers in the brief period of 
parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. Student movements, sometimes involving 
street demonstrations, arrests, and imprisonment, continued to punctuate even the 
deepest periods of authoritarian rule under Suharto. Yet, middle-class liberalism was 
never translated into an effective or coherent force in Indonesia during authoritarian 
rule.
It is natural that authoritarian regimes are hostile to liberal political movements 
and ideas. In Indonesia, the particular corporatist and functionalist influences in 
authoritarian politics provided especially effective weapons in keeping civil society 
and liberal politics at bay. The notion of a single national interest embodied in the 
corporatist and populist ideals of both "guided democracy" and Suharto's 
development state denied the legitimacy of claims by liberals for political participation 
and representation outside the prescribed functionalist frameworks.59 In this Orwellian 
circumstance, there was no room for the incubation of the sort of progressive civil 
society and its independent institutions expected by liberal pluralists.
The disorganization of liberal politics was not reliant on repression. Rather, the co­
option of the middle classes, including critics and more moderate opponents, was to be 
the primary means of defusing and domesticating potential opposition. For the middle 
class, access to patronage, jobs, and careers, and to the benefits of economic growth, 
came at the cost of accepting that the arena of politics was bounded by a single state 
ideology (Pancasila) and confined within a form of state-managed electoralism 
dominated by a state political party (Golkar) and smaller, approved political parties 
(PDI, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party; and PPP, Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party).
At another level, it is critical that political liberalism was never able to become the 
ideological basis for wider alliances between the middle class and the bourgeoisie, 
while an emerging working class was largely separated from social democratic 
political traditions.60 Importantly, Indonesia's bourgeoisie had been formed in
58 For example, one of his companies, Lapindo Brantas, is widely considered responsible for massive 
mudflows that have destroyed the ecology of a significant swath of East Java, as well as the homes and 
livelihoods of tens of thousands of ordinary people.
59 David Bourchier, "Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, Monash 
University, Melbourne, 1996); and David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).
60 Vedi Hadiz, Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia (London: Routledge, 1997).
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circumstances where the state controlled the gateways through which private interests 
might enter the economy—the vast networks of licenses, monopolies, concessions, and 
contracts that provided access to resources, trades, and bank credit. It was an 
accommodation that suited Indonesia's bourgeoisie, providing a broad shelter for a 
bourgeoisie that was predominantly ethnic Chinese and therefore vulnerable to the 
threats of both social radicalism and reactionary populism so important in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The political agenda of the Chinese bourgeoisie has always been to protect 
these arrangements and to develop close alliances and relationships with powerful 
officials and political power-holders rather than replacing them with open markets and 
transparent and general rules.61
It is important, too, that the social and political basis of the regime was changing. 
These changes were manifest, not least, in deepening struggles for control of the 
military, often depicted as conflicts between secular and "green" (Islamic) political 
factions, but, in reality, a conflict in which oligarchy had begun to assert its authority 
over the old institutions and interests of state capitalism and over the officials of 
Benedict Anderson's "state qua state."62 Oligarchy had, in fact, become constrained by 
state capitalism and economic nationalist policy as the public monopolies of state 
capitalism were progressively and selectively expropriated and transformed into 
private monopolies. However, it is significant that, in this drift towards a kind of 
market politics where money and oligarchic power were increasingly ascendant, the 
old authoritarian structures became less necessary.
When the Suharto regime collapsed, political liberals believed they were going to 
play a central role in deciding the way politics was to be reconstructed in Indonesia. 
The reformasi movement made strident demands for a new political era to be based on 
the classical liberal principles of individual rights and popular democracy. The World 
Bank, the IMF, and other international development organizations played a pivotal 
role in driving the new laws on politics and decentralization that were to define 
democratic politics and administrative authority after Suharto. However, the 
movement ultimately faded into a relatively uncoordinated series of mainly student 
actions sporadically connected with the activities of a small liberal intelligentsia. 
Compared with the middle-class liberals and their leftist allies subsequently involved 
in the Arab Spring, for example, the would-be Indonesian reformers were even more 
disorganized and bereft of a real political or social narrative.
In fact, those who might be considered the representatives of progressive liberal- 
minded civil society have been pitched into a political arena defined by proliferating 
corruption and money politics and the rise of extra-legal forms of social and political 
violence and coercion. They were quickly marginalized in an ongoing struggle where a 
resurgent oligarchy was able to build new and more pervasive social and political 
alliances and settle comfortably into the new democratic ambience.
Despite their early efforts to impose institutional changes and subsequent attempts 
to prop up the reforms through various programs of capacity building, "good
61 Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital; Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia.
62 Benedict Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical 
Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42,3 (1983): 477-96; Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power in 
Indonesia.
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governance," and democracy promotion, the international development organizations 
had limited influence over the course of change in Indonesia. In any case, neoliberals 
have always harbored suspicion of democracy as a form of government that could 
open the door to distributional coalitions and predatory raiders and frustrate the 
efficient workings of markets.63 Some neoliberal commentators have even looked back 
with some degree of nostalgia to the certainties that authoritarian rule provided to 
technocratic planners and investors alike.64
As a proliferation of political parties emerged to contest the elections, it was 
significant that no new parties emerged on the basis of liberal or social democratic 
ideas to seize the moment. The long-awaited presidency of Megawati failed to deliver 
on its claims to the populist legacy of Sukarnoism. Megawati's tenure was to be 
defined instead by policy failure and murky alliances with the military and business. 
Not surprisingly, parliaments and the political parties became widely regarded as 
major realms for corruption. The former state political party, Golkar, quickly became 
the home of many former leading figures of the Suharto era, even if some have 
migrated to other parties, including the Democratic Party. If there are any signs of 
something different, they come from the populist and xenophobic Right and from 
parties like Gerindra, led by Prabowo Subianto. In this context, the parallels with 
Thailand's Thaksin Shinawata and his fusion of populism and business interests are 
clear.
Surviving D ecentralization: H ow  L ocal Pow er Was Reorganized
Decentralization of government and administration has been long regarded by 
neoliberal policy makers, not least in the World Bank and the IMF, to be ideally suited 
to ensure government accountability and the liberation of individuals and businesses 
from stifling centralized control to enable them to be innovative and enterprising. At 
another level, populist NGOs have regarded decentralization as a path to the 
empowerment of local citizens and grassroots social organizations.65 There is no doubt 
that the decentralization of government and administration in Indonesia under Laws 
22 and 25 of 1999 has been far-reaching. This so-called "big bang" of decentralization 
saw real administrative and financial authority shifted into the hands of regents 
(ibupatis) and mayors and to local parliaments.66
These new institutional arrangements have enabled a vigorous electoral politics to 
emerge at these lower, regional levels and have allowed the expression of local 
opposition and demands in a way not possible before. Voters have proven willing to 
throw incumbents out of office if they displease them, and, in some cases, reformist 
mayors and bupatis have been elected even when they ran against the heavyweights of 
established parties and cliques. Some of these successful candidates have even made
63 See James Dorn, "Economic Liberty and Democracy in East Asia," Orbis 37,4 (1993): 599-619; and F. A. 
Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 2001).
64 Ron Duncan and Ross McLeod, "The State and the Market in Democratic Indonesia," in Indonesia: 
Democracy and the Promise o f Good Governance, ed. Ross McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), pp. 73-92.
65 Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia.
66 Nankyung Choi, Local Politics in Indonesia: Pathways to Power (London: Routledge, 2011).
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progress in cleaning up moribund bureaucracies and cleaning out corrupt cliques and 
individuals.67 However, these accomplishments are not necessarily indicative of the 
early stages of a more general rise of progressive interests at the local level.
Moreover, Hadiz has argued that the decentralization of political and 
administrative institutions has more generally provided opportunities for the same 
kinds of social interests previously at the heart of Suharto's New Order to assert their 
power at the local level.68 Thus, the vast majority of local parliamentary candidates, as 
well as individuals vying for positions as bupatis and mayors, have been drawn from a 
pool of former officials, party apparatchik, as well as business figures and gangsters, 
many of whom had helped to exercise authority at the local level on behalf of the old 
authoritarian regime.69 Even where reformist and progressive figures have emerged, 
they necessarily have had to make accommodation with entrenched political and 
economic forces and to operate within circumstances already in place. The point is that 
while the new institutions may have made some things newly possible, what really 
matters, at the local level as well as the national level, are the kinds of interests that are 
able to organize politically to influence and profit from the institutions.
Conclusions: Where to Now?
As we noted earlier, the oligarchy thesis has been criticized for an underlying 
pessimism about the prospects for social and political reform in Indonesia and for 
dismissing the significance of democratic transformation and of the efforts to reform 
public institutions. One source for these criticisms is to be found among pluralist 
scholars, including R. William Liddle and Thomas Pepinsky.70 For Liddle, the 
oligarchy thesis denies not only the possibility of progressive liberal transformation 
but also the possibility of individual agency in politics and of political action by 
individuals on behalf of democratic consolidation. In Liddle's view, politics operates in 
Machiavellian terms, so that the accumulation of power resources by individuals, such 
as wealth, position, and status, is achieved by astute strategic decisions, including 
decisions made when building political and economic alliances or capturing votes in 
elections.
Thomas Pepinsky argues that the oligarchy thesis cannot provide an account of the 
complexity of power struggles or the importance of non-material power resources, nor 
can it acknowledge and explain the sheer number or fluidity of elements that constitute 
the oligarchic system, which is often intent on survival rather than any enduring ideas 
or policy agendas. The theoretical key to the analysis of Indonesian politics lies, 
therefore, according to Pepinsky, in a form of critical pluralism that recognizes the 
fluid and shifting processes wherein coalitions are formed and dissolved according to
67 Luky Djani, "Reform Movements and Local Politics in Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, Murdoch 
University, 2013).
68 Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia.
69 Ibid., especially Chapter 4.
70 See R. William Liddle, "Improving the Quality of Democracy in Indonesia," this volume; and Thomas 
Pepinsky, "Pluralism and Political Conflict in Indonesia," this volume.
The Political Economy of Oligarchy 55
changing circumstances and based on interacting material and non-material resources, 
including that of identity.
A further criticism is that the oligarchy thesis underplays the importance of 
political conflicts taking place at the margins and within the lower orders of society, 
not least at the local level. Edward Aspinall, for example, points to the widespread rise 
of reformist movements and cites their—sometimes successful—demands for reforms 
in labor and in the provision of social safety nets and services in health and education, 
protection for the environment, the elimination of corruption, and so on.71 This 
evidence can be interpreted either as proof of a fundamental theoretical failure of the 
oligarchy thesis or, more simply, proof of the theory's adherents' failure to recognize 
and give proper weight to the importance of politics from below within the basic 
theoretical framework of the oligarchy thesis.
What is disputable from the structural political economy perspective is the larger 
transformative significance of these forms of oppositional politics. Such a concern can 
be illustrated if we imagine a circumstance—that the current oligarchy in Indonesia 
has disintegrated, due to internal fractures or perhaps in combination with another 
deep global economic crisis. In such a case, there would be no guarantee that an 
alternative form of rule could take its place, sustained by a set of coherently organized 
social interests. In other words, there could be a repeat of the situation that came about 
at the end of the Suharto era, when there was no reformist coalition ready to step into 
the temporary void before old interests reorganized, thus ensuring that the New Order 
legacy continues to this day. What set of circumstances, then, can break this cycle?
Our basic propositions are that real change cannot be achieved so long as the social 
order of the previous regime and its ascendant political forces remain intact and in 
charge of the state. Attempts to induce change by institutional fixes and programs of 
"good governance" cannot bypass the bitter and sometimes violent conflicts over 
power that historically accompany social and political transformation. Incremental 
demands for reform by individuals or groups can only be piecemeal if they do not 
achieve a broader political ascendancy and control over the state. This means that a 
transformation of substance, rather than a descent into chaos or simply more of the 
same, requires both the disintegration of the old order and its social underpinnings 
and the forging of a new social order with its political forces.
All this does not mean that Indonesia is necessarily caught in a state of permanent 
atrophy or that oligarchy is unassailable. Where, then, should we look for the potential 
sources of change? We propose that, rather than looking outside the broader system of 
oligarchy itself, to those attempting to bring it down, we should look within the 
framework of oligarchy, for that is where the dynamics of change are most likely to be 
forged. From the perspective of structural political economy theory, one potential 
source is generated as capitalism outgrows its predatory roots and where capital 
begins to see its interests in more predictable and transparent regulation and in rule of
71 See Edward Aspinall, "Popular Agency and Interests in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation," this volume. See also Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and 
Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
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law.72 In Indonesia, these tensions are shown in disputes over mining regulation, 
investments laws, and corporate governance (as revealed in the conflict over Bumi Pic, 
involving the Bakries and the Rothchilds). They are also crystallized in battles over the 
authority and reach of the KPK and other regulatory institutions, battles that take place 
with government and within the oligarchy itself.
However, there are difficulties here. One is that capital has historically been 
politically opportunist rather than reformist, reluctant to accept the risks of attaching 
itself to reformist politics. Indonesia's middle classes, too, have been incubated within 
the framework of the state and have shown little appetite for engaging in reformist 
opposition or for establishing political relationships with, for example, organized 
labor, as was sometimes the case in Europe. Invariably, the reform of capitalism has 
required the intervention of the state itself throughout history. And numerous systems 
of authoritarian rule and/or oligarchy have shown a remarkable resilience in the face 
of neoliberal policy and institutional reforms.73 Nor is there necessarily any 
fundamental disjuncture between illiberal politics and market capitalism.74 Waiting for 
the logic of the machine to drive reform may be a forlorn prospect. Singapore and 
China are only two examples of countries where successful capitalist economies can 
flourish within highly illiberal political systems.
It is also true that the growing reach of global governance over the rules of trade, 
investment, and public management is offset by the extensive relations that exist 
among various governments and oligarchies in the developing world with 
international investors and Western governments, relations that are important in 
sustaining those less developed states and their economies.75 International capitalists 
are often enthusiastic about the way authoritarianism can sweep away environmental, 
labor, and welfare coalitions and remove regulatory constraints on their commercial 
ambitions. For Western governments and international organizations, activities that 
involve them in the fortunes of oligarchies are often intermingled with strategies to 
preserve these special advantages for investors.
A second potential source of contradiction within an oligarchy can be found in the 
highly diffuse, decentralized, and corruption-ridden system of money politics that has 
emerged in Indonesia. Significantly, it is a system that may prove to be increasingly 
exclusionary as the cost of gaining access to the spoils of state power generally grows 
beyond the reach of all but a few. Maybe it is in this way that decentralization will 
ultimately reveal its true significance: by opening new sites of localized conflict caused 
by the failure of an oligarchic power structure to absorb properly the ambitions of the 
growing armies of apparatchiks, local fixers, entrepreneurs, and enforcers that it has 
assembled across the archipelago.
77 See, for example, Paul D. Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism: The Politics o f Banking in The Philippines (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). In this study, Hutchcroft provides an extensive overview of Weberian 
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73 See, for example, Joshua Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2012).
74 Garry Rodan, Transparency and Authoritarian Ride in Southeast Asia: Singapore and Malaysia (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
75 Mick Moore, "Political Underdevelopment: What Causes Bad Governance?," Public Management Review 
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Our analysis concludes that for the cycle to be broken and a new social order put in 
place nothing less is required than a deeper social and political revolution, whether in 
liberal or other directions.
